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Recently, great progress has been achieved in economics: happiness has been seriously measured, and many of its 
determinants have been identified. This constitutes a sharp break from the notion, much cherished by economists, 
that revealed preferences only reliably reflect individual utility, and that it is the only way to make serious 
measurements. In happiness studies, instead of inferring utility from data on income and prices, people are directly 
asked about their subjective well-being.  
This paper wants to draw attention to this important development and discusses its consequences for the theory of 
economic policy. Three propositions are put forward: 
(1) The measurement of happiness constitutes a great advance for economics; 
(2) It is a mistake to leap to the conclusion that happiness should be maximized (in the sense of social welfare 
function maximisation); 
(3) Happiness research strengthens the validity of an institutional approach (in the sense of a democratic economic 
policy). 
Section I briefly discusses the concepts of utility and happiness basic to the argument. The following section 
provides econometric estimates of happiness functions. Section III argues that maximising such a happiness function 
is erroneous for several reasons. The next section demonstrates empirically that the institutional approach suggested 
by the theory of democratic economic policy is fruitful. The final section V summarises the results and shows that 
the study of happiness (i) helps to better grasp the role of institutions in economy and society; and (ii) is an area well-
suited for the integration of economics and psychology.  
I. Utility and Happiness 
Economic analysis builds on individual utility which is inferred from choices. Happiness is a different concept of 
utility. This section provides a short overview1of the several types of utility (subsection A); happiness is more fully 
discussed in subsection B. In subsection C, the relationship between the behaviouristic utility concept and the 
measure of happiness is briefly discussed. 
 
A. Types of utility 
Standard economic theory (and decision science) uses an „objectivist” position2 based on observable choices made 
by individuals. Individual utility only depends on tangible factors (goods and services), is inferred from revealed 
behavior (or preferences), and is in turn used to explain the choices made. This „modern“ view is influenced by the 
positivistic movement. It rejects subjectivist experience (e.g. captured by surveys) as being „unscientific“, because it 
                                                           
1 An extensive discussion with many references is given in Lane (1991: 423-590). See also Benedikt 
(1996: 557-579). 
2  See Kahneman and Varey (1991), Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) for the term "objectivist" (and 
"subjectivist"). 
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is not objectively observable. It is assumed that the choices made provide all the information required to infer the 
utility of outcomes. Moreover, the axiomatic revealed preference approach is not only applied to derive individual 
utility, but also to measure social welfare. To do so, social welfare comparison is based on consumption behaviour of 
households.3 Econometrically, this is realised e.g. by using parametric translog indirect utility functions (Jorgenson, 
Lau and Stoker 1980). 
This positivistic view is dominant in economics. Sen (1986: 18) observes that „the popularity of this view in 
economics may be due to a mixture of an obsessive concern with observability and a peculiar belief that choice (...) 
is the only human aspect that can be observed“. Its dominance is also reflected in the contents of microeconomic 
textbooks. However, not all contemporary economists subscribe to this view. Numerous scholars challenge standard 
decision, individual utility and welfare theory from different angles. Five reservations are mentioned here due to 
their importance for the following discussion on the use of subjective measures of happiness. Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem is separately discussed in section III. 
i) There are numerous examples for non-objectivist theoretical analyses in economics. They incorporate emotions 
(e.g. Elster 1998), such as regret (e.g. Bell 1982), self-signaling (self-esteem), goal completion, mastery, and 
meaning (Loewenstein 1999) or status (e.g. Frank 1985), as well as even broader considerations beyond the normal 
use of utility (e.g. Sen's 1982  „entitlements“). 
ii) Standard theory assumes independent utilities, although interdependent utilities fit particular observed behaviour 
much better (e.g. Clark and Oswald 1998). More important, interdependent utilities question traditional welfare 
propositions (e.g. Boskin  and Sheshinski 1978, Holländer 1999). 
iii) By emphasising the value of outcomes rather than observed decisions, Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) 
distinguish various types of utility. They base their concept on the notion that outcomes are normally extended over 
time and that they are valued at different points in time. Predicted utility “refers to beliefs about the experienced 
utility of outcomes”; remembered utility “is inferred from a subject’s retrospective reports of the total pleasure or 
displeasure associated with past outcomes”, and instant utility measures “hedonic and affective experience, which 
can be derived from immediate reports of current subjective experience or from physiological indices” (pp. 376f). 
The differences between these evoke a number of positive questions that have not yet been answered in a satisfactory 
way, e.g., “How is the remembered utility of extended outcomes determined?” (p. 378). The hedonistic concept by 
Kahneman et al. being based on axiomatic rules to aggregate subjective experiences, normative issues need also be 
considered. This approach is related to an old tradition. The initiators of the modern analysis of decision-making 
(Bernoulli and Bentham) understood utility as satisfaction, referring to the hedonic quality in terms of pleasure and 
pain. In analogy to Kahneman et al., this early idea may be called 'experience utility', and the „modern“ idea 
discussed above 'decision utility' (p. 375). 
                                                           
3 This welfare indicator is suggested as an improvement compared to consumer’s surplus. In their 
empirical work, especially in the large number of cost-benefit analyses, economists have relied heavily on 
consumer's surplus to measure the welfare effects of changes in incomes and prices. Yet, „it is now widely 
accepted that consumer's surplus should not be used as a welfare measure“ (Slesnick 1998: 2108). 
 4
iv) The previous remarks reveal that the position of psychologists has differed markedly from the economic one. 
They value subjective experience as an important source of information about individual utility. Psychologists are 
less convinced that choices are always rational (see the vast literature on anomalies in decision-making, e.g. Thaler 
1992), and therefore doubt that utility can meaningfully be derived from observed choices. Moreover, they go 
beyond tangible carriers of utility and emphasise the importance of emotions, such as fear and hope, disappointment, 
guilt and pride. 
v) Psychologists have also transcended the consequentialism (of which utilitarianism is a special case, see Hammond 
1991) and have considered procedural utility. The independent influence of procedural fairness on individual utility 
has been well established in laboratory and field experiments (Tyler 1990, 1997). 
To conclude, individual and social welfare indicators that stick to decision utility are unable to integrate the broader 
aspects of experience and procedural utility.4 The exclusive reliance on an objectivist approach by standard economic 
theory is thus open to doubt, both theoretically and empirically. There is room for the subjectivist approach of 
happiness, to which we turn now. 
 
B. Happiness 
„For most people, happiness is the main, if not the only, ultimate objective of life“ (Ng 1996: 1). Happiness can be 
understood to mean a „lasting, complete and justified satisfaction with life as a whole“ (Tatarkiewicz 1976: 16). 
Happiness, or as it is often called, subjective well-being, is measured by representative surveys. There is a vast 
literature on the measures and correlates of subjective well-being. A possible single-item measure is the individual 
question „how satisfied are you with your life taken as a whole?“. The answer is given on a scale from three points 
up to eleven points. These surveys were initiated by social psychologists, who have much experience in carefully 
administrating this research technique. 
For a long time, Easterlin (1974) has been the only economist to seriously consider happiness. A discussion in the 
Economic Journal, with contributions by Oswald (1997), Frank (1997) and Ng (1997), has recently sparked interest.5 
In psychology, there is a much older and broader tradition. A first review of the state of the art was written by 
Wilson (1967) almost 35 years ago. Monographs on happiness have been published e.g. by Argyle (1987), Myers 
                                                           
4 In fact, such subjectivist notions of happiness are even today often disregarded, without providing a 
reason; as done e.g. by Slesnick (1998: 2109) in his long survey on "Empirical Approaches to the 
Measurement of Welfare". 
5 Recently published works are e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994), Easterlin (1995), Frey and Stutzer (1999a), 
Gerlach and Stephan (1996), Kenny (1999), and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998). Yet unpublished 
papers are e.g. Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1999), Frey and Stutzer (1999b), Konow and Earley 
(1999), Namazie and Sanfey (2000) and Ravallion and Lokshin (1999). 
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(1993) and the sociologist Veenhoven (1993), and a recent survey has been prepared by Diener, Suh, Lucas and 
Smith (1999). Lane (1991, part IV) gives an overview of both the psychological and the economic literature.6 
The surveys on happiness have a high scientific standard. The measures of happiness have high consistency, 
reliability and validity. Happy people are e.g. more often smiling during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and 
Ruiz-Belda, 1995), are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz, 1993), as well 
as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988). Furthermore, the measures of subjective well-being have a high degree of 
stability over time (Headey and Wearing, 1989). Happiness measures have also been shown to be reflected in 
behaviour, e.g. „people who call themselves happy ... are more likely to initiate social contacts with friends; more 
likely to respond to requests for help; ... less likely to be absent from work; less likely to be involved in disputes at 
work ...” (Frank 1997: 1833). But there is, of course, room for methodological concerns (e.g. Diener et al. 1999: 277-
8). Economists should, however, not be too critical, in view of the deficiencies of what they measure and use as a 
matter of course. National income is a case in point. Its shortcomings are obvious and need not be discussed here. 
But the same applies to more innocuous concepts such as real income (e.g. Kapteyn 1994). Moreover, as will be 
demonstrated in this paper, the main use of happiness measures is not to compare levels, but rather to seek to identify 
the determinants of happiness. 
 
C. Relationship between individual utility and happiness 
Directly measurable subjective happiness, and derived „objective“ decision utility (as commonly used in economics), 
enter economic research from different sides. Their mutual aim is to investigate individual and social welfare. 
However, happiness is a much broader concept than decision utility; it includes experience as well as procedural 
utility. It may be argued that happiness is the fundamental goal of people, because to be happy is a goal in itself (Ng 
1999: 209). That is not the case for other things we may want, such as job security, status, freedom, and especially 
money (income). We do not want them for themselves, but rather to give us the possibility of making ourselves 
happier. 
 
II. Micro- and Macroeconometric Happiness Functions 
Happiness functions seek to establish an econometric relationship between the happiness measure and the 
determinants of happiness. The data on happiness are gathered e.g. in the Euro-Barometer Survey, which asks the 
question: „On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you 
lead?“ This yields a four-scale index of happiness. The U.S. General Social Survey asks the question: „Taken all 
together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?“ This yields a three scale index of happiness. 
                                                           
6 Country specific contributions are Glatzer and Zapf (1984), Glatzer (1992) and Noelle-Neumann (1996) 
for Germany and Leu, Burri and Priester (1997: chapter III.7) for Switzerland. 
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Existing econometric estimates analyse happiness mainly with regard to four sets of micro and macro factors: 
a) Individual variables, such as employment status, income, education and demographic factors;  
b) Macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment rate, inflation rate, gross domestic product per capita and 
unemployment benefits. 
Table 1 shows such microeconometric happiness functions for a pooled cross-section time series estimate for 
Germany, 1975-1991 (taken from Di Tella et al. 1999), and for Switzerland, 1992. The latter estimate is based on 
survey results of more than 6,000 inhabitants in Switzerland collected by Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). (The 
variables are described in Appendix I. Summary statistics for Switzerland are presented in Appendix III.)7 
The estimates for Germany and Switzerland reveal qualitatively very similar effects on happiness (but, in the case of 
Switzerland, somewhat more determinants are statistically significant). The effect on happiness of individual 
unemployment is strongly negative in a highly statistically significant way (p < 0.01). For Switzerland, Table 1 also 
reports the marginal effect for the highest score of happiness. With unemployment, the marginal effect is – 0.284. 
This indicates that the probability of an unemployed person reporting the highest level of happiness is (cet. par.) 28.4 
percentage points smaller than for an employed person. Or, equivalently, the share of unemployed persons reporting 
to be „completely satisfied“ is 28.4 percentage points smaller than  
                                                           
7 The significance levels that are indicated for the results for Switzerland take into account stratification in 
sampling. Therefore, p<0.01 for  |t|>2.88, 0.01<p<0.05 for 2.17<|t|<2.88 and 0.05<p<0.10 for 
1.81<|t|<2.17. 
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Table 1 – Determinants of Satisfaction with Life in Germany and Switzerland 
 
       
 Germany 1975-1991 
Di Tella et al. (1999) 
 Switzerland 1992 
       
       
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
Marginal 
effect 
       
       
a) Employment status      
    employed Reference group Reference group 
    unemployed -0.421** 0.036  -0.834**   0.041   -0.284  
    self employed 0.023 0.029  0.105**   0.023   0.036  
    at home 0.024 0.022  0.177**   0.023   0.060  
    school 0.027 0.033  0.047   0.102   0.016  
    retired 0.079** 0.027  -0.118**   0.039   -0.040  
    other    0.186**   0.054   0.064  
b) Income      
    first quartile Reference group Reference group 
    second quartile 0.186** 0.020  0.056(*)   0.028   0.019  
    third quartile 0.319** 0.021  0.151**   0.027   0.052  
    fourth quartile 0.452** 0.022  0.263**   0.027   0.090  
c) Education 
    low 
 
Reference group 
 
Reference group 
    middle 0.001 0.018  0.176**   0.017   0.060  
    high 0.110** 0.023  0.136**   0.025   0.046  
d) Demographic factors      
    female Reference group Reference group 
    male -0.029 0.016  -0.027   0.016   -0.009  
    age -0.008** 0.003  -0.010*   0.004   -0.004  
    age squared 1.20e-4** 2.87e-5  1.76e-4**  4.27e-5   0.1e-3  
    marital status: single Reference group Reference group 
 married 0.154** 0.023  0.107**   0.021   0.037  
 divorced -0.330** 0.037  -0.178**   0.033   -0.061  
 separated -0.408** 0.076  -0.612*   0.257   -0.208  
 widowed -0.078* 0.033  -0.077   0.052   -0.026  
    no. of young children: one -0.014 0.021    
  two -0.027 0.028    
  three -0.046 0.049    
       
Threshold parameters: one -1.944** 0.071          0.302**          0.026   
  two -0.850** 0.069          0.724**           0.027   
  three 1.086** 0.070          1.060**           0.027   
  four            1.529**           0.027   
  five            2.286**           0.027   
  six            2.767**           0.027   
       
Observations 28151  6126   
Log likelihood function -25881.1   -10321.77   
       
 
Notes: Ordered probit estimation (weighted for Switzerland). Dependent variable: level of satisfaction on a four point 
scale for Germany and on an eight point scale (scores of 1, 2 and 3 were aggregated) for Switzerland, respectively. 
The regression for Germany includes region dummies and year dummies from 1975 to 1991. The regression for 
Switzerland includes a constant term. Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Source for Germany: Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1999). 
Data source for Switzerland: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). 
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for employed persons, cet. par. As can also be seen from Table 1, to be self-employed and work at home 
significantly raises happiness in Switzerland (cet. par.). But while people in Germany report a higher well-being 
when retired, the opposite holds for Switzerland (a result worth further inquiry). 
The second set of factors report the highly significant positive effect on happiness of income as measured by 
quartiles: higher income thus seems to improve the human lot, but it does so only a little, as revealed by the marginal 
effects for Switzerland.8 The third set of factors refers to education. Persons with higher education report higher 
happiness than those with low education (this effect has also been found in other studies, see e.g. Oswald 1997: 1823 
or Diener et al. 1999: 293). 
Demographic factors (the fourth set of influences) have statistically significant effects on happiness. Age has a U-
formed impact: the young are happier than persons around 30 years of age, and thereafter happiness rises with age. 
Married persons are happier than singles, and divorced persons are unhappier than singles. These results are 
supported by other studies on the effect of demographic variables  on happiness (e.g. Oswald 1997: 1823, and the 
survey by Diener et al. 1999: 289-293). 
Table 2 presents two macroeconometric happiness functions for a panel of eleven European countries, 1972-1991 
(again from Di Tella et al. 1999). The results indicate that higher unemployment and inflation rates decrease 
satisfaction with life, while higher unemployment benefits and income per capita increase subjective well-being. 
However, per capita income has only a significant effect on happiness if the two macroeconomic bads are included in 
the estimation model as an aggregate misery index composed of a non-weighted addition of the inflation and the 
unemployment rate. 
Robustness analyses of micro- as well as macroeconometric happiness functions reveal that most signs of the 
coefficients remain stable when the specification of the estimation equation is varied. Happiness functions are thus 
able to well capture important determinants of reported subjective well-being. 
Table 2 – Macroeconomic Conditions and Satisfaction with Life in 11 European Countries 
 
      
 (1)  (2) 
      
      
 Coefficient Standard error  Coefficient Standard error 
      
      
Unemployment rate (U) -1.629** 0.531   
Inflation rate (π) -1.116** 0.344   
GDP per capita 3.9e-5 3.1e-5 5 5.4e-5* 2.7e-5 
Unemployment benefits 0.590** 0.155 0.615** 0.151 
Misery index (U + π)   -1.194** 0.323 
      
                                                           
8 This result confirms Easterlin's (1974) well-known finding that higher income within a country raises 
happiness. Careful surveys of the large number of studies dealing with the relationship between happiness 
and income conclude that higher income does raise happiness but not to a large extent (see the survey by 
Diener and Oishi 1999 and Diener et al. 1999: 287-289). 
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Observations 150  150  
Adjusted R2 0.16  0.16  
      
 
Notes: Panel estimation with control for country and time fixed effects, and corrected for heteroscedasticity using 
White’s method. Dependent variable is the mean residual life satisfaction for each year and each country. The 
residuals are generated in a first step with OLS regressions on individual characteristics for each country (for 
characteristics see table 1). Explanatory variables are three year moving averages. Unemployment benefits are the 
OECD index of replacement rates (unemployment benefit entitlements divided by the corresponding wage). 
Significance levels: * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Source: Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1999). 
 
III. Should Happiness be Maximised? 
An obvious temptation is to consider happiness functions as a reasonably good (the best existing) approximation to a 
social welfare function, and to maximize them. The optimal values of the determinants thus derived are – according 
to this view – the goals which economic policy should achieve. It seems that, at long last, the (so far empirically 
empty) social welfare maximum of the quantitative theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1956, Theil 1968) has 
been filled with life. 
This is exactly how the influential paper by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1999) proceeds. They open their 
paper with the following statement: „Modern macroeconomics textbooks rest upon the assumption of a social 
welfare function defined on inflation, π, and unemployment, U. To our knowledge, no formal evidence for such a 
function W (π, U), has ever been presented in literature. . . . Although an optimal policy rule cannot be chosen unless 
the parameters of the presumed W (π, U) function are known, that has not prevented the growth of a large amount of 
theoretical literature in macroeconomics“ (p. 2; without footnotes). 
Such an endeavour overlooks some fundamental problems of the social welfare maximisation approach (Frey 1983: 
182-194). Only one shortcoming, empirical emptiness, has been overcome (provided one is prepared to accept 
happiness functions as a reasonable approximation of a social welfare function). Two other problems remain, namely 
the problem of preference aggregation and the missing incentives:  
 
(1) Impossibility theorem 
Since Arrow (1951), it is known that under a number of „reasonable“ conditions, no social welfare function exists 
that generally ranks outcomes consistently, except a dictatorship. This impossibility result spawned a huge amount of 
literature (called Social Choice), analyzing its robustness to modifications of the assumptions. Theorem after 
theorem demonstrated that almost all changes in the axiomatic structure left the dictatorial result unchanged (see e.g. 
Sen 1995, Slesnick 1998). It must be concluded that „there is no way we can use empirical observations on their own 
to produce an ethically satisfactory cardinalization, let alone an ethically satisfactory social welfare ordering“ 
(Hammond 1991: 220-21). 
This verdict applies to happiness functions if they are used as quasi social welfare functions.  
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(2) Missing incentives 
Deriving optimal policies by maximizing a social welfare function only makes sense if the government has an 
incentive to put the optimal policies into reality. This is only the case if a „benevolent dictator“ government is 
assumed (Brennan and Buchanan 1985). From introspection as well as from empirical analyses in Political  Economy 
(see e.g. the collection of papers on Political Business Cycles in Frey 1997b), we know that governments are not 
benevolent and do not follow the wishes of the population, even in well-functioning democracies, not to mention 
authoritarian and dictatorial governments. Hence, to maximize social welfare corresponds to a 'technocratic-elitist' 
procedure neglecting the crucial incentive aspect. 
This criticism applies fully to the endeavor to derive optimal policies by maximizing happiness. 
There is a solution at hand which overcomes the problems posed by the impossibility theorem and by the 
government's missing incentives. Constitutional Political Economy (e.g. Buchanan 1991, Frey 1983, Mueller 1996) 
redirects attention to the level of the social consensus where, behind the veil of ignorance, the basic rules governing a 
society – the fundamental institutions – are chosen or emerge. At the same time, the approach shifts from a (vain) 
effort to directly determine social outcomes to shaping the politico-economic process by setting the institutions. The 
following section empirically demonstrates that the fundamental social institutions do indeed systematically 
influence happiness. 
 
IV. Happiness and Institutions 
The fundamental social institutions shape the incentives of the policy makers. Once these basic institutions are in 
place, and the incentives therefore set, little can be done to influence the current politico-economic process. 
Economic policy therefore must help to establish those fundamental institutions, which lead to the best possible 
fulfilment of individual preferences. Research in positive constitutional economics helps to identify which 
institutions serve this goal, and whether they do in fact systematically affect happiness. 
According to the modern theory of institutions, we hypothesize that two basic institutions importantly affect 
happiness: direct democracy and federalism. 
 
A. Direct democracy 
Over the last few years, extensive econometric research has demonstrated the beneficial effects of direct democratic 
institutions on political outcomes. (Semi-) direct democracy allows the citizens to decide on substantial political 
issues via popular initiatives and referenda (see e.g. Budge 1996). While practically all countries have used referenda 
at one time or another (e.g. to vote on entry to the  European Union), by far the greatest number of referenda have 
been undertaken in the United States (on the state and local level) and in Switzerland (on the national, cantonal and 
communal level) (Butler and Ranney 1994). 
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The results of the research on direct democracy are the subject of various surveys (e.g. Kirchgässner et al. 1999). For 
the United States, government expenditures and government revenues are lower with institutions of direct democracy 
(Matsusaka 1995). In contrast, educational public expenditures are higher when a referendum is possible (Santerre 
1993). For Switzerland, the econometric evidence is even more compelling, one reason being that the institutions of 
direct democracy are better developed than in the U.S., and their effect on political outcomes can be better identified. 
Public expenditures in 131 Swiss cities are lower by 14%, but the median tax rate is higher9 by 14% in cities with 
well developed institutions of referenda (Feld and Kirchgässner 1999). Due to a 5% higher share of self-financing, 
the per capita debt is no less than 45% lower. In addition, public expenditures exhibit significantly lower growth in 
cities with well established direct democracy (Schneider and Pommerehne 1983). Tax evasion is significantly lower 
in cantons with a higher degree of direct participation rights for voters (Frey 1997a). Finally, gross domestic product 
per capita is 5.4% higher in cantons with better established direct democratic institutions than in more representative 
ones (Feld and Savioz 1997). All these results are based on estimates which carefully control influences unrelated to 
direct democracy, and establish a causal effect from that institution on political outcomes and their consequences in 
terms of behavior (tax evasion) or economic activity (income). We now test the proposition whether democratic 
institutions systematically affect happiness. 
The test proceeds by extending the happiness function for Switzerland presented above by a variable representing the 
influence of direct democracy. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects for all 
the determinants taken into account in Table 1. The coefficients, and in particular the marginal effects of 
employment status, income, education and demographic factors, correspond to those in Table 1. 
In addition, the effect of „direct democratic rights“ is revealed. Direct democratic rights is an index capturing the 
varying extent of direct participation possibilities in the 26 cantons of Switzerland, ranging from 1 („low extent of 
direct democratic rights“) to 6 („high extent of direct democratic rights“) (for the index construction see appendix II). 
Table 3 reports a statistically highly significant (p<0.01) positive influence of direct democratic rights on happiness. 
The marginal effect on the highest happiness level (score 10) is 0.033: An increase in the index of direct participation 
rights by one point (say from 4 to 5) raises the probability of belonging to that highest happiness class by 3.3 
percentage points. This means that individuals in canton Solothurn (with an index score of 5.42) respond with an 
approximately 12 percentage points higher probability that they are „completely satisfied“, than residents in canton 
Geneva (with an index score of 1.75). 
Table 3 – Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland: Effect of Direct Democracy 
 
    
 Coefficient Standard error Marginal effect 
(score 10) 
    
    
a) Employment status    
                                                           
9 There are two countervailing effects. Voters prefer lower taxes in order to have a higher disposable 
income. At the same time they are prepared to tolerate higher taxes because they believe that they are 
more wisely and more efficiently spent when they can control directly the political outcome. In the above 
case, the second effect dominates. 
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    employed  Reference group  
    unemployed -0.831** 0.041 -0.282 
    self employed 0.109** 0.023 0.037 
    at home 0.171** 0.023 0.058 
    school 0.022 0.104 0.007 
    retired -0.116** 0.039 -0.039 
    other 0.180** 0.054 0.061 
b) Income    
    first quartile  Reference group  
    second quartile 0.052(*) 0.028 0.018 
    third quartile 0.142** 0.027 0.048 
    fourth quartile 0.239** 0.027 0.081 
c) Education 
    low 
  
Reference group 
 
    middle 0.150** 0.017 0.051 
    high 0.121** 0.025 0.041 
d) Demographic factors    
    female  Reference group  
    male -0.024 0.017 -0.008 
    age -0.011** 0.004 -0.004 
    age squared 1.82e-4** 4.25e-5 0.1e-3 
    marital status: single  Reference group  
 married 0.105** 0.021 0.036 
 divorced -0.172** 0.032 -0.058 
 separated -0.623* 0.265 -0.212 
 widowed -0.078 0.051 -0.027 
e) Institutional factor    
    direct democratic rights 0.096** 0.007 0.033 
    
Observations 6126   
Log likelihood function -10292.51   
    
 
Notes: Weighted ordered probit estimation. Dependent variable level of satisfaction is on an eight point scale (scores 
of 1, 2 and 3 were aggregated). Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Data source: Leu, Burri and Priester (1997) and Stutzer (1999). 
 
 
B. Federalism 
Federalism is a second fundamental institution relevant for subjective well-being. „... those who value a federal 
system typically do so for some mix of three reasons: it encourages an efficient allocation of national resources; it 
fosters political participation and a sense of the democratic community; and it helps to protect basic liberties and 
freedoms” (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997: 44). The first reason given is emphasized by Oates (1994: 130), who states 
that „[t]he tailoring of outputs to local circumstances will, in general, produce higher levels of well-being than a 
centralized decision to provide some uniform level of output across all jurisdictions ...”.10 
                                                           
10 The set of arguments in favor of federalism is combined and extended in a new federal concept based on 
functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) (Frey and Eichenberger 1999). 
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Here, we take up the traditional argument of fiscal federalism mentioned above and directly test the proposition that 
the extent of decentralization affects happiness. The differences in the degree of federalism in the 26 Swiss cantons is 
captured by an index of local autonomy. The index is based on survey results by Ladner (1994). Chief local 
administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local autonomy on a ten 
point scale, with one indicating „no autonomy at all“, and  ten „very high“ communal autonomy. Average scores for 
each canton were calculated from the answers. (The index is shown in Appendix II.) 
Estimate (1) in Table 4 shows the statistically positive effect (p<0.01) on happiness by the extent of local autonomy 
in the cantons. The coefficient is slightly larger than the one for direct democracy in Table 3.  
In order to keep the table as simple as possible, only the estimated coefficient (and statistical significance) for this 
particular institutional variable is reproduced, although the ordered probit estimation includes all the variables shown 
in Table 1 (as in Table 3, the signs of the coefficients are unchanged, and their size is little affected). 
Table 4 also exhibits estimates demonstrating that the influence of the two fundamental institutional variables – 
direct democracy and federalism – is fairly robust. Equation (2) indicates that direct democracy remains an important 
determinant of happiness, even when local autonomy is simultaneously taken into account: the coefficient remains 
similar to the one in Table 2 and is equally statistically significant (p<0.01). The effect of decentralization as 
measured by local autonomy in the cantons has a lower statistical significance (0.05<p<0.10) than in equation (1), 
the reason being some extent of correlation (r = 0.444**). Direct democracy and federalism in Switzerland seem to 
be complements rather than economic substitutes. Local autonomy is thus one of the several “transmission 
mechanisms” of direct democracy’s beneficial effects. 
Table 4 –Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland: Effect of Federalism 
 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Individual factors a)-d) yes yes yes Yes yes 
      
Institutional factors      
    Direct democratic rights  0.087** 
(0.008) 
 0.081** 
(0.011) 
0.065** 
(0.012) 
    Local autonomy in canton 0.102** 
(0.011) 
0.026(*) 
(0.014) 
  0.050** 
(0.015) 
      
Additional structural  factors      
    National income per capita 
        in canton (in 1'000) 
  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
    Population in canton 
        (in 100'000) 
  -0.015** 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
-0.009** 
(0.002) 
    Urbanisation   0.086** 
(0.018) 
-0.095** 
(0.019) 
-0.090** 
(0.019) 
    French speaking canton   -0.278** 
(0.019) 
-0.127** 
(0.029) 
-0.128** 
(0.029) 
    Italian speaking canton   0.045 
(0.045) 
0.233** 
(0.052) 
0.225** 
(0.052) 
      
Observations 6126 6126 6126 6126 6126 
Log likelihood function -10309.73 -10291.94 -10273.70 -10264.44 -10262.53 
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Notes: See table 2. Coefficients with significance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data sources: Ladner (1994), Leu, Burri and Priester (1997), Stutzer (1999) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(various years). 
C. Sensitivity analysis 
Various alternative explanations have been put forward for the empirical findings reached. These explanations focus 
on the possibility of spurious regression due to missing structural variables, in our case the income level, the 
population size, the degree of urbanisation and the major language spoken in a canton. If there is substantial 
correlation between the set of control variables and the institutional factors, one of the following counter hypotheses 
could be valid: i) in cantons where inhabitants are richer than the Swiss average, the public provision of goods can be 
quantitatively or qualitatively augmented and thus raises subjective well-being, ii) people living in smaller cantons 
are happier, iii) people living in an urban area suffer from disamenities of urbanisation and experience lower 
satisfaction with life (assuming that direct democracy is a phenomenon restricted to rural areas) and iv) differences in 
language or culture explain differences in happiness levels across cantons. 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) of Table 4 include the five additional control variables in the regression model. The results 
are as follows: the aggregate income variable is negatively correlated with subjective well-being. Though statistically 
significant, the coefficient itself is small. People living in cantons with fewer inhabitants, or in a rural area, are in fact 
more satisfied with life. These results are only to a small degree sensitive to the inclusion of institutional factors. In 
contrast, the partial correlation between major language in a canton and satisfaction with life depends on whether 
institutional factors are included. Living in a French-speaking canton is negatively correlated with happiness. The 
effect, however, is smaller, if institutional differences are considered. In the case of the Italian-speaking canton 
Ticino, existing direct democratic rights are low, and thus low happiness scores are to be expected. However, this is 
not the case, judging from the positive coefficients in equations (4) and (5).  
Most importantly, the significant positive effect on life satisfaction of the indices for direct democracy and 
federalism remain, when controlling for alternative explanatory variables. The coefficients are somewhat smaller in 
equation (5) than in (2) and (4). Direct democracy and federalism thus have a robust and sizeable effect on 
satisfaction with life over and above differences of cantons, with regard to wealth, population size, urbanisation and 
language. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Happiness research adds a new element to economics. It stands in stark contrast to the „objectivist“ way economists 
have measured welfare via revealed preference. Happiness is a „subjectivist“ measure of individual welfare, and it is 
much broader than the way individual utility is normally defined. It seeks to capture a fundamental and stable goal of 
people, the „satisfaction with life taken as a whole“. While happiness is not derived from actual behaviour, it is 
systematically and closely connected with generally accepted manifestations of well-being. 
This paper identifies important determinants of happiness via econometrically estimated micro and macro functions 
with data for Germany, Switzerland and a set of eleven European countries. Among individual determinants, 
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unemployment, income, education and marital status stand out, while among the macroeconomic determinants it is 
the rate of unemployment and inflation that stand out. 
Following the tradition of social welfare maximization, some scholars have been tempted to try to maximize the 
estimated happiness functions. Such an endeavor overlooks the fundamental problems of welfare aggregation and, 
even more importantly, the missing incentives of  governments to pursue a happiness maximization policy. Rather, 
scholars should follow the institutional approach taken by the theory of democratic economic policy. The paper 
empirically demonstrates for the case of Switzerland that the institutions of direct democracy and federalism are two 
such institutions systematically affecting individual well-being. This novel research field thus underlines the 
importance of process rather than outcome-oriented economic policy. 
The empirical analysis is consistent with the three propositions advanced at the beginning of the paper: (1) happiness 
research constitutes a significant advance in economic research; (2)  happiness functions should not be maximized; 
and (3) institutions in the form of type of democracy and extent of political decentralisation crucially affect 
individual well-being. 
Happiness research moreover represents a case of a productive cross-fertilization of two otherwise isolated fields, 
economics and psychology. 
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Appendix I 
 
Definition of variables 
a) Sample for Germany 
Satisfaction with life: Discrete variable (four values) from Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1975-1991). Question: „On 
the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with your life you lead?”. 
Response categories: „Very satisfied”, „fairly satisfied”, „not very satisfied” and „not at all satisfied”. (Not included in 
data set: „don’t know” and „no answer” categories.) 
Employment status: Dummies for unemployed or self-employed people, housekeepers, people at school, retired people 
and others. Reference group employed people. 
Income: Dummies for second, third and fourth income quartile. Reference group lowest income quartile. 
Education: Dummies for education to age 15-18 years (middle) and education to age 19 years or over (high). Reference 
group low education. 
Demographic factors: Dummies for male, married, divorced, separated and widowed people and people with one, two or 
three 8-15 year old children living at home. The reference groups are female, single and people with no children. Age in 
years. Age in years squared. 
b) Sample for Switzerland 
Satisfaction with life: Discrete variable (ten values) from Leu, Burri and Priester (1997). Question: „How satisfied are 
you with your life as a whole these days?“. Simultaneously, the respondents were shown a table with a ten point scale of 
which only the two extreme values („completely dissatisfied“ and „completely satisfied“) were verbalised. For the 
estimation model the scores of 1, 2 and 3 were aggregated. 
Employment status: Dummies for unemployed or self-employed people, housekeepers, people at school, retired people 
and others. Reference group employed people. 
Income: Dummies for second, third and fourth income quartile. Reference group lowest income quartile. The income 
measure is calculated as an equivalence income. Total household income after taxes and social security expenditure is 
divided through the equivalence scale of the Swiss conference for public assistance (SKOS).  
Education: Dummies for middle and high education. Reference group low education. 
Demographic factors: Dummies for male, married, divorced, separated and widowed people and foreigners. Reference 
groups female, single and Swiss. Age in years. 
National income p.c.: Nominal national income per capita in a canton in 1992 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 1997). 
Population: Average number of residents in a canton in 1992 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 1993). 
Urbanisation: Dummy for people living in an urban area. Reference group people living in a rural area. 
 
Appendix II 
 
Index for direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons 
Direct democracy is here defined in terms of individual political participation possibilities. In Switzerland, institutions 
for the direct political participation of citizens exist on the level of the federal state as well as on the level of cantons. 
However, the direct democratic rights on the level of cantons are very heterogeneous. Therefore, an index is constructed 
to measure the different barriers for citizens entering the political process, apart from elections in the year 1992. The 
index is based on data collected in Trechsel and Serdült (1999) (for details see Stutzer 1999). 
The four main legal instruments to directly influence the political process in Swiss cantons are 
a) the initiative to change the canton’s constitution, 
b) the initiative to change the canton’s law, 
c) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new or changing law and 
d) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. 
Barriers are in terms of 
a) the necessary signatures to launch an instrument (absolute and relative to the number of citizens with the right to 
vote), 
b) the legally allowed time span to collect the signatures and 
c) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a financial referendum. 
(Compulsory referenda are treated like referenda with the lowest possible barrier.) 
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Each of these restrictions is evaluated on a six point scale: „one” indicates a high barrier, „six” a low one. From the 
resulting ratings, a non-weighted average is calculated, which represents the measure of direct democratic rights in 
Swiss cantons. The results are presented in table A.1. 
 
Table A.1 – Index for direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons in 1992 
 
Canton Index Canton Index Canton Index 
Aargau 5.46 Graubünden 4.75 Schwyz 4.93 
Appenzell i. Rh. 5.25 Jura 3.71 Thurgau 4.04 
Appenzell a. Rh. 5.50 Luzern 4.48 Ticino 2.10 
Bern 3.50 Neuchâtel 2.13 Uri 5.42 
Basel Land 5.69 Nidwalden 4.92 Vaud 2.42 
Basel Stadt 4.40 Obwalden 5.58 Valais 3.42 
Fribourg 2.42 Sankt Gallen 3.40 Zug 4.42 
Genève 1.75 Schaffhausen 5.08 Zürich 4.17 
Glarus 5.50 Solothurn 5.42   
 
Index for local autonomy in Swiss cantons 
The index for local autonomy is based on survey results by Ladner (1994). Chief local administrators in 1856 Swiss 
municipalities reported how they perceive their local autonomy on a ten point scale, with one indicating „no autonomy 
at all“, and  ten „very high“ communal autonomy. Average scores for each canton are presented in table A.2. 
 
Table A.2 – Index for local autonomy in Swiss cantons in 1994 
 
Canton Index Canton Index Canton Index 
Aargau 4.9 Graubünden 5.8 Schwyz 4.6 
Appenzell i. Rh. 5.0 Jura 4.0 Thurgau 5.9 
Appenzell a. Rh. 5.8 Luzern 4.1 Ticino 4.3 
Bern 4.6 Neuchâtel 3.7 Uri 5.4 
Basel Land 4.3 Nidwalden 5.5 Vaud 4.7 
Basel Stadt 5.5 Obwalden 6.0 Valais 5.5 
Fribourg 4.2 Sankt Gallen 4.9 Zug 6.0 
Genève 3.2 Schaffhausen 6.1 Zürich 5.4 
Glarus 5.6 Solothurn 4.9   
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Appendix III 
 
Table A.3 – Summary Statistics – Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland 
 
      
 Satisfaction 
with life 
Mean/Share Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
      
      
Satisfaction with life 8.219  8.219  1 10  1.717  
      
a) Employment status   
    employed 8.209  0.383  Dummy  0.486  
    unemployed 6.562  0.021  Dummy  0.144  
    self employed 8.306  0.109  Dummy  0.312  
    at home 8.384  0.142  Dummy  0.349  
    school 8.199  0.024  Dummy  0.153  
    retired 8.230  0.298  Dummy  0.458  
    other 8.368  0.022  Dummy  0.147  
b) Income      
    first quartile  7.994   0.249  Dummy  0.433  
    second quartile  8.172   0.249  Dummy  0.432  
    third quartile  8.245   0.251  Dummy  0.434  
    fourth quartile  8.464   0.251  Dummy  0.434  
c) Education 
    low 
 
 7.975  
 
 0.309  
 
Dummy 
 
 0.462  
    middle  8.309   0.554  Dummy  0.497  
    high  8.407   0.137  Dummy  0.344  
d) Demographic factors      
    female 8.219  0.503  Dummy  0.500  
    male 8.219  0.497  Dummy  0.500  
    age   50.051  20 102  19.362  
    age squared   2.880e+3  400 10.404e+3  2.038e+3 
    marital status: single 8.076  0.230  Dummy  0.421  
 married 8.356  0.598  Dummy  0.490  
 divorced 7.600  0.061  Dummy  0.240  
 separated 6.500  0.004  Dummy  0.060  
 widowed 8.178  0.108  Dummy  0.310  
      
Direct democratic rights   3.832   1.75   5.69   1.080  
Local autonomy   4.791  3.2 6.1  0.645  
National income p.c. (in 1'000)   42.686   31.77   73.98   7.411  
Population (in 100'000)   5.513  0.14 11.75 3.724 
Living in a rural area 8.295 0.348 Dummy 0.476 
Living in a urban area 8.179 0.652 Dummy 0.476 
German speaking cantons 8.305 0.757 Dummy 0.429 
French speaking cantons 7.887 0.197 Dummy 0.398 
Italian speaking canton 8.237 0.046 Dummy 0.210 
      
 
Notes: The number of observations is 6126. All the descriptive statistics are not weighted. 
Data sources: Ladner (1994), Leu, Burri and Priester (1997), Stutzer (1999) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(various years). 
 
